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Railroad 'Safety Culture Wars'


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#1 CNJRoss

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Posted 07 December 2017 - 11:13 AM

Railway Age, 11/17/17:
 

Culture wars, Part 1

 

Written by  David Schanoes

 

 

I spent three hours viewing the video archive of the Nov. 14, 2017 National Transportation Safety Board meeting convened to review and approve the findings, probable cause and safety recommendations developed from NTSB investigation into the April 3, 2016 collision of Amtrak 89 with M/W equipment at Chester, Pa., on the Northeast Corridor.

 

The circumstances of the accident:

 

SNIP

 

The cause of this accident is transparently clear to even the most casual observer: the release of the foul time on 3 by the overnight EIC when the track was still obstructed by the backhoe.

 

The cause of the fatalities is also transparently clear: the failure of the day EIC to ascertain that foul time protection was in place before entering the track and obstructing train movement.

 

What is not so transparently clear, but is a fact, is that when an accident results because of employee failure to properly comply with and utilize the protections offered and required by the operating rules and procedures, you can bet that while the accident itself may be a “one-off,” the violations are not. You can be sure that the violations of procedure have achieved the status, or near that, of a regular practice, as in “I’ve done it this way 1,000 times before and it’s always worked.”

 

The video archive of this meeting should be mandatory viewing for those responsible for safe train operations. All the items in the NTSB’s docket (DCA16FR007) should be required reading.

 

 

David Schanoes is Principal of Ten90 Solutions LLC, a consulting firm he established upon retiring from MTA Metro-North Railroad in 2008. David began his railroad career in 1972 with the Chicago & North Western, as a brakeman in Chicago. He came to New York 1977, working for Conrail’s New Jersey Division. David joined Metro-North in 1985. He has spent his entire career in the operating division, working his way up from brakeman to conductor, block operator, dispatcher, supervisor of train operations, trainmaster, superintendent, and deputy chief of field operations. “Better railroading is ten percent planning plus ninety percent execution,” he says. “It’s simple math. Yet, we also know, or should know, that technology is no substitute for supervision, and supervision that doesn’t utilize technology isn’t going to do the job. That's not so simple.”

 

More here.

 

Related:  Palmetto (89) vs. Backhoe in Chester, PA; 2 fatalities 4/3/16

 



#2 CNJRoss

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Posted 07 December 2017 - 11:18 AM

Railway Age, 11/21/17:
 

Culture wars, Part 2

 

Written by  David Schanoes

 

 

 

Hello, J.D. Congratulations on your retirement. I’ve missed working with you, and the GAS man, and AFF, and all, I mean all the others, all these years.

 

I know you read the first post, and you saw the draft sections of this second part where I was going to parse, more or less, the NTSB board member comments and discussions and point out the errors and misconceptions expressed therein. But you know what J.D.? That’s all pretty much besides the point, the point being that two people are dead, and they shouldn’t be.

 

The point J.D. is what we already know to be true: that it takes the constant vigilance of line officers to reduce the risk of a catastrophic accident on the railroad. Not that railroads aren’t safe. They are. Not that the vital principles of train operations aren’t the principles of safe train operations. They are. Not that technological improvements, sensible regulation and improved culture aren’t critical constituents of a safe railroad. They are. But those are the “passive” elements. They are “plan” so to speak. Line officers are the active agents of railroad safety, the “execution” so to speak. It really is 10% planning, 90% execution.

 

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