This could be an interesting case. The NTSB has long recommended the railroads discontinue using "after-arrival track authority" in "dark territory." From an NTSB news release dated Feb 12, 2013
Contributing to the accident was CN’s use of after-arrival track authorities in non-signaled territory, a procedure that is vulnerable to human error and lacks safety redundancies. The NTSB noted crew fatigue and inadequate crew resource management also contributed to the accident.
“Since 1996, the NTSB has investigated four other head-on collisions where after-arrival track authority was causal,” said Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “Relying on a system that depends on error-free human performance for safety is a recipe for disaster.”
Related topic: NTSB: Crew Error Caused 2010 CN Collision in Minnesota
The NTSB issued Safety Recommendation R-13-016 to NS and 3 other Class 1 railroads:
"Discontinue the use of after-arrival track authorities for train movements in nonsignaled territory not equipped with a positive train control system."
None of the 4 railroads has taken "acceptable" action:
Canadian Pacific Railway (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Kansas City Southern Railway Company (Open - Unacceptable Response)
Norfolk Southern Corporation (Closed - Unacceptable Action)
Union Pacific (Open - Unacceptable Response)
{Related Safety Recommendation R-13-009 to CN; (Open - Unacceptable Response)}
Railroads continue "Relying on a system that depends on error-free human performance . . ."
-Ross