7 replies to this topic

[KevinKorell]

WPIX-TV, PIX-11 in New York, NY, 5/18/17:

 

 

Metro-North train derails in Rye

 

 

A Metro-North train derailed in Rye late Thursday afternoon, officials say.

 

It happened around 5 p.m. near the Rye station in Westchester County.

 

Story

 

Another mess.  As of this time only 1 of the 4 tracks is open.  Amtrak goes through there too.  The location is on a curve adjacent to where I-95 and I-287 come together.

[KevinKorell]

WABC-TV, ABC-7 in New York, NY, 5/18/17:

 

 

Minor Metro-North train derailment in Rye

 

 

 

A Metro-North train derailed in Rye in Westchester County on late Thursday afternoon.

It happened behind the Avon building on Midland Avenue near the 95/287 Interchange at 5:10 p.m.

 

More

[KevinKorell]

NBC New York, 5/18/17:

 

Metro-North Train Derails in Westchester, 13 Injured

 

A Metro-North train derailed in Westchester, injuring more than a dozen people and leading to delays during Thursday's evening rush, MTA officials said. 

 

Read

[KevinKorell]

WAMC Radio, 5/19/17:

 

Metro-North Derailment In Rye Renews Call For PTC

 

A Metro-North commuter train derailment Thursday in Westchester County that authorities say resulted in minor injuries has federal lawmakers ramping calls for technology upgrades.

 

Story

[CNJRoss]

Connecticut Post, Bridgeport, CT 6/29/17:

NTSB: bend in track caused Rye, N.Y. Metro-North derailment

 

• 

Photo: National Transportation Safety Board / Contributed Photo

 

A bend in Metro North's track can be seen prior to the May 18 derailment near Rye N.Y. that injured 14 passengers and two crew members.

 

 

A “nasty kink” in a Metro-North track — possibly caused by excessive heat — led to the May derailment of a commuter train that injured 16 people after leaving Stamford for New York City, federal investigators said.

 

The May 18 accident in Rye, N.Y., came after Metro-North learned of the bend in the steel tracks, attempted repairs and lowered the speed limit from 60 mph to 10 mph, according to a preliminary report by the National Transportation Safety Board.

 

One engineer, after traveling over the suspect section of track hours prior to the derailment, radioed Metro-North controllers and said “Yeah, that kink is pretty bad… I went over it doing 15 (mph) and I could still feel it pretty significantly,” the NTSB said.

 

SNIP

 

“According to the preliminary investigation, the engineer failed to properly comply with a 10 mph temporary speed restriction that was in effect for a heat-induced track alignment change,” Gamerman said. “The engineer involved has been removed from service.”

 

The accident appears far worse than initially thought, said James Cameron, a founder of the Commuter Action Group and a Hearst columnist, after reading the NTSB report.

 

More here.

 

[CNJRoss]

NTSB Preliminary Report posted 6/27/17:

 

 

Preliminary Report, Metro-North Derailment, Rye, NY

 

Executive Summary

​

The information in this report is preliminary and will be supplemented or corrected during the course of the investigation.

 

On May 18, 2017, about 4:56 p.m., eastern daylight time, westbound Metro-North Railroad commuter train 1373 derailed at milepost 24.55 on main track 3 of the Metro-North Railroad’s New Haven Line in Rye, New York. Train 1373 originated from Stamford, Connecticut and was destined for Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan, New York when 5 of the 12 cars in the consist derailed. Of the 185 passengers on the train, 14 reported minor injuries. Two crewmembers (train engineer and conductor) also reported minor injuries.

On May 17-18, 2017, the temperature was above normal. At the time of the accident, the wind was from the west at 12 knots, visibility was unrestricted at 10 statute miles, partly cloudy sky and temperature of 93°F.

The engineer and conductor of train 1373 went on duty at 6:15 a.m. and made a round trip to Grand Central Terminal during the morning rush hour. After their interim release, the train crew met at 4:15 p.m. and received the train equipment at Stamford Yard. Train 1373 consisted of 12 electrically-powered multiple-unit passenger cars that included a controlling cab car.

Approximately 85 trains per day normally operate over main track 3. However, main track 1 was out of service so approximately 104 trains per day had been operating on track 3 at the time of the accident. Normally, the maximum authorized train speed throughout this segment of track was 60 mph for passenger trains; however, at the time of the derailment, a temporary speed restriction of 10 mph was in effect.

Records indicated that at 1:20 p.m., the engineer of Metro North train 1359 reported a possible track condition on main track 3 between catenary bridges 213 and 214. Two track inspectors were in their hi-rail vehicle conducting a track inspection for potential heat related track problems near the area. They proceeded to the location and found the track was misaligned. They made repairs and, at 2:02 p.m., gave the track back to the rail traffic controller for normal operating speed.  About 2:54 p.m., the engineer of Metro North train 1365 reported a “real nasty kink in the rail” on main track 3 between catenary bridges 214 and 215. The Metro North rail traffic controller, in coordination with the chief dispatcher, placed a 30-mph speed restriction on the track at that location until the track could be inspected. At 3:23 p.m., the engineer of Metro North train 1367 reported over the radio: “Yeah, that kink is pretty bad…I went over it doing 15 and I could still feel it pretty significantly.” The Metro North rail traffic controller lowered the speed restriction to 15 mph, and the speed restriction limits were changed between catenary bridges 214 and 216. At 3:51 p.m., a track supervisor arrived at the catenary bridge 215 location and lowered the speed restriction to 10 mph, due to the track misalignment. (See figure 1.)

Figure 1. Pre-accident photo taken by track foreman, looking west on track 3 toward catenary bridge 215.

The track supervisor said that he thought the track was misaligned about 2-inches, but he did not measure the deviation. He watched about four trains pass over the area, and said the deviation did not change. At 4:30 p.m., as he was preparing to leave the area, the track supervisor said Metro North train 1371 passed through faster than the 10-mph speed restriction. The track supervisor reported the incident to the rail traffic controller and inspected the track. He said the alignment did not worsen and departed the area. About one-half hour later, the rail traffic controller called and told him that the area had worsened. Shortly thereafter, he was notified that train 1373 derailed.

Probable Cause

The information in this report is preliminary and will be supplemented or corrected during the course of the investigation.

 

 

[KevinKorell]

lohud.com   / Journal-News, White Plains, NY, 2/28/18:

 

Port Chester man sues Metro-North for injuries in Rye derailment

 

 

A Port Chester man is suing Metro-North after hitting his head while riding the New Haven Line train that derailed last spring.

 

 

Update

[CNJRoss]

NTSB 10/23/19

​Railroad Accident Brief: Derailment of Metro-North Railroad Commuter Train Rye, New York

 

Executive Summary

​On May 18, 2017, at 4:56 p.m. eastern daylight time, westbound Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North) commuter train 1373 derailed at milepost (MP) 24.55 near catenary bridge 215 on main track 3 of the Metro-North New Haven Line in Rye, New York. Train 1373 originated from Stamford, Connecticut, and was destined for Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan, New York, when 5 of the 12 cars in the consist derailed. Train 1373 had 185 passengers, of which 12 passengers suffered minor injuries. Four crewmembers (one conductor and three assistant conductors) also reported minor injuries.

Probable Cause

​The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this derailment was the engineer of Metro-North Railroad commuter train 1373 failing to remember the 10-mph temporary speed restriction and operating his train at 55.9 mph into a 10-mph speed-restricted area. Contributing to the accident was the engineer’s failure to communicate the temporary speed restriction to the conductor who could have reminded the train engineer of the upcoming speed restriction. Also contributing to the accident was the lack of a fully operational positive train control system, which would have stopped the train in advance of the speed-restricted area.

 

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